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The “Next Generation EU” project (NGEU) will lead to a fundamental change in the
architecture, political structure, and “finalité” of the integration process. In its scope
and depth, it is even comparable to the Maastricht reform. The EU’s claim of being
able to borrow EUR 750 billion on capital markets and to pass it on to the Member
States purely on the basis of existing competences changes the EU’s financial
constitution more than the EU institutions are willing to admit. There is no doubt
that this is an “extraordinary” step, as the proposal to amend the Own Resources
Decision states.1)COUNCIL DECISION (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December
2020 on the system of the European Union’s own resources and repealing Decision
2014/335/ EU, Euratom, OJ 2020 L 424/1. But it will neither be a temporary nor
a singular step. One should not be blinded by the political “spin” with which the
measure is being sold. There are already calls for another debt-financed support
program to follow NGEU.
The decision to increase the Union’s financial volume (which is normally managed by
parliament via the EU budget) through a mechanism that bypasses the EU budget
raises a multitude of questions, both with regard to questions of integration policy
and of law. So far, there has been little, perhaps too little, talk about them. Since,
due to the pandemic, action must be taken quickly; some thorny issues have been
avoided so far. Pushing ahead with the issue of bonds, the European Commission’s
attitude seems to be that the ratification of the amended Own Resources Decision
by the EU member states is only a (tiresome) formality. This is regrettable. However,
it is clear that “NGEU” is supported by a broad political majority both in Member
State’s political institutions and populations.
Yet another violation of Constitutional identity?
Against this background, should and could the German Federal Constitutional Court
(BVerfG) step in to protect Germany´s “constitutional identity”? Is this really yet
another case of German political institutions forgetting about the constitution and
violating its identity? Attacking European policy as a violation of Article 79 (3) of the
Basic Law has become a sometimes tiring ritual that possibly does more damage
to the constitution than it adds to its validity and normativity. Be that as it may:
taking into account the amorphous and flexible nature of constitutional identity as
developed by the BVerfG, the NGEU could (at least in principle) be easily accused of
being unconstitutional. And indeed, in its decision of 15 April 2021 the Court opens
the door to a lengthy review process.
It is a consistent continuation of procedural case law when the BVerfG does
not declare the constitutional complaint against the Legislative Act approving
the Amended Own Resources Decision to be manifestly inadmissible (paras.
74-93). Here, the Court consistently follows its case law on the protection of the
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constitutional identity, the defense against ultra vires acts, the protection of the
budgetary sovereignty of the German Parliament and the safeguarding of the
Parliament’s overall budgetary responsibility, as developed by the Court since 2011.
On the one hand, the BVerfG sees the possibility that the 2020 Own Resources
Decision might be an ultra vires act (paras. 92-93). The Court does not see any
transfer of competences from Germany to the EU in the German Legislative
Approval Act itself (para. 80). It is possible, however, that the German legislature
might help the EU to act in violation of EU competences. Indeed, not only do
considerable parts of German legal literature assume that the EU is prohibited from
incurring debts (citations in para. 92; however, without evidence for the opposing
view). Until recently, EU institutions, too, have expressed this view. Yet, those
statements disappeared overnight from the EU Commission’s website when the idea
to develop debt-based instruments came up in spring 2020. This is where several
open legal questions lie—even if it can be safely assumed that the ECJ, dealing with
the matter via Art. 267 TFEU, would not see any obstacles under EU primary law.
The question that the BVerfG – probably due to the interim nature of the decision
– does not address is how the EU’s indebtedness could lead to a structurally
significant shift in competence to the detriment of an EU member state such
as Germany. It is probably well known in this circle that the Court reclaims to
declare only those acts ultra vires that entail a structurally significant shift in the
relationship between the EU’s and member states’ competences. A more creative,
less competence-oriented and more financial policy-oriented approach would
possibly be able to recognise such shifting effects as a consequence of adopting the
new Own Ressources Decision. Yet, it would require closer discussion if such an
approach would lead to a (further and unacceptable) softening of the requirements
of ultra vires control as instituted by the German Court and based on the principle of
democracy (!). It is striking that these central questions are only touched upon in an
otherwise rather detailed decision.
Possible, but not likely
On the other hand, the Federal Constitutional Court sees the possibility that the
new EU Own Resources Decision and the German Ratification Act could violate the
overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag and thus might constitute
a violation of Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law (paras. 87-91). The basic problem of
this decision’s aspect is that the Court, on the one hand, does not want to cut off the
possibility of an open-ended examination of the complaint on the merits (according to
the announcement: in a multi-year proceeding). On the other hand, asserting that the
overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag is actually impaired would
be simply implausible. The only way out for the Court is to emphasize on various
occasions that the Own Resources Decision 2020 could impair the overall budgetary
responsibility of the Bundestag and thus might violate the constitutional identity
(paras. 87, 103). Since the raising of capital by the EU does not lead to a direct
financial liability of the Federal Republic of Germany, as the BVerfG recognises
(para. 99), the obligation to make additional contributions provided for in Article 9
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(4) of the Own Resources Decision 2020 gains central (but, in terms of fiscal or
integration policy, grotesquely exaggerated) significance.
More generally, the Court finds itself forced to stress the importance of the same
observations at one point and to devalue them at another: While the Court still
considers the applicants’ diffuse factual argument in the context of dealing with
the admissibility of the appeal in the main proceedings to be viable (paras. 87-91),
it rejects precisely this factual argument when it states at a later point that there
is no high probability that the Own Resources Decision-Ratification Act violates
Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law (paras. 95, 98-103). One cannot help but wonder how
even a low probability of a constitutional violation (after all: against the politically
untouchable and unchangeable core contents of the German constitution according
to Article 79 (3) GG) can be possibly claimed. At one point, the Court even feels
compelled to point out that the applicants did not take into account central fiscal
and budgetary circumstances—however, even this is said to “not a priori preclude”
the possibility of a violation of constitutional identity (para. 91). As a result, the
Court concludes that it is not likely that Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law is violated. It
remains “possible”, however, that the admissibility requirements of the constitutional
complaint are still fulfilled.
If the Court would have denied the admissibility of the constitutional complaint on
the merits because no sufficient possibility of a violation of constitutional identity
was discernible, this should have led to a quick dismissal in the interim proceedings.
However, the Court would also have deprived itself of the possibility to deal with the
matter for the years to come.
Under pressure from the pandemic
The Karlsruhe Court is carrying out its judicial control of European integration
in the shadow of major EU politics—and against the background of a pandemic
whose economic and socio-political consequences are causing serious damage
in EU member states and might even become an existential danger for the EU.
NGEU is not an act of political discretion, but a necessary reaction forced by the
pandemic. The BVerfG is aware of this, as it shows when weighing of consequences
as required under § 32 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (Law on the German
Constitutional Court) (paras. 105-107). Even though some political uncertainty had
arisen in recent weeks: No one could seriously expect the BVerfG to stand in the
way of implementing the political decision of July 2020.
However, the temporary order issued on 26 March 2021 against the German
President, temporarily prohibiting ratification (reference in para. 63), made it clear
that the BVerfG intends to deal with the matter in greater depth. The decision of
15 April 2021 now openly states that a lengthy procedure with the possibility of
referral to the ECJ is to be expected (para. 105). Yet, by the time a decision will
be reached, the NGEU funds will have been already raised and passed on to EU
member states by the Commission. Even if the BVerfG will find a violation of Article
79 (3) of the Basic Law, it will not be possible to reverse this development. The Court
is aware of this fact and reacts by repeating the well-known sentences according
- 3 -
to which the German constitutional institutions would then have to oppose the
further implementation, oppose any further steps and work towards eliminating any
consequences (para. 111). In such a case, according to the Court, there could also
be a duty to oppose an update of the Own Resources Decision and not to agree to
a decision on a new Multiannual Financial Framework. How this is supposed to help
in a situation where the EU financial commitments have already been made and the
money borrowed has disappeared into the Member States’ national budgets is not
entirely clear.
Like under a burning glass, the decision of 15 April 2021 exemplifies the greatness
and tragedy of the BVerfG’s claim to protect a German constitutional identity (which
it has always had to define first) against the European Union’s and Germany’s
political institutions. Even supporters of integration must be baffled by the way in
which central principles of the EU treaties, basic assumptions of integration policy
and longstanding consensual interpretations of EU law have been repeatedly
denounced or even broken in the shadow of a crisis in order to realise what seemed
opportune at the time. If the BVerfG would counter this and make clear that a
fundamental restructuring of the EU financial architecture is only possible on the
basis of a primary law revision, this would be a great gain in terms of integration
policy. However, the BVerfG will only be able to act at such a late stage that its
intervention will probably do more harm than good. If the BVerfG would qualify the
EU decision as ultra vires in the main proceedings, this would be much more serious
than the minor accusation of faulty reasoning that it raised against the ECB in the
decision of 5 May 2020; and the clash with the ECJ, whose decision on the EU law
compatibility of the 2020 Own Resources Decision is probably already set, would be
much more brutal.
And there is another point worth considering: If the BVerfG were to declare the
German Legislative Approval Act for the 2020 Own Resources Decision null and void
in the main proceedings, this would have an ex tunc effect under German state law.
However, the validity of the Own Resources Decision under EU law would not be
called into question. This is because such a court decision would not eliminate the
ratification act of the Federal Republic of Germany. To do so, the applicants would
also have to challenge the declaration of the German President. Moreover, it is
unclear under EU law whether a subsequent repeal of a Member State’s ratification
act would affect the validity of an EU own resources decision once it has been
established pursuant to Article 311 (3) TFEU. It is certain that it would be irrelevant
under EU law if the Member State body responsible for giving “consent” (Art. 311 (3)
TFEU) would later decide to withdraw its consent again for political reasons – this
would not affect an own resources decision once it has entered into force. Would
it be different if a member state court revoked the consent on legal grounds? The
legal assessment is difficult, not least because the adoption of the Own Resources
Decision does not constitute consent to an amendment of the Treaty. The general
principles of international law on the relationship between the external binding nature
of an act of ratification and internal violations of law cannot be directly applied to this
situation.
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What then is the value of the main proceedings now pending? At least it seems
possible that the BVerfG will decide that any future renewal or extension of the
EU powers to raise financial funds may no longer be possible on such a shaky
construction as the NGEU but would require a Treaty amendment. And it also seems
possible that the Court will insist that financial resources of the size in question
must be comprehensively managed by the EU parliament in an EU budget. In this
case, the Karlsruhe Court would have made an important contribution to the future
development of the EU.
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